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Diagnostic uncertainties are intricately associated with genomic testing—especially 
concerning new technologies such as exome sequencing—with test results being ei-
ther inconclusive or generating secondary findings or showing variants of uncertain 
significance. In the process of genetic counseling, diagnostic uncertainties have to be 
managed even when test results for an individual client are either positive or nega-
tive because of differential implications for family members. Previous studies have 
investigated diagnostic uncertainties in relation to clients wanting to know or not 
know the test results; here, we extend this line of research by addressing how genetic 
counselors and clients account for the management of diagnostic uncertainties vis-
à-vis the attendant ethical tensions in the complex communicative environment in 
the clinic setting. Our dataset from the Norwegian context is longitudinal, consisting 
of ten audio-recorded pre-test genetic counseling sessions. It involves one extended 
family with a high burden of colorectal cancer. Through theme-oriented discourse 
analysis, we demonstrate how diagnostic uncertainties give rise to tensions concern-
ing risks and benefits of knowing in both professional and familial spheres, which 
then map onto accounts of various role responsibilities. For instance, in looking for 
certainty via advanced genomic testing to reduce diagnostic uncertainty for clients, 
genetic counselors are confronted with tensions regarding what can be communi-
cated and made known because of their role responsibilities toward what may be re-
garded as scientific others and clinical others. Likewise, clients are faced with tensions 
concerning wanting to know/not know, which invokes various familial others and may 
align or not align with genetic counselors’ preferences, especially relating to manage-
ment of diagnostic uncertainties and secondary findings.
K E Y W O R D S
benefits and risks of knowing, communication, diagnostic uncertainty, ethical tensions, exome 
sequencing, genomic testing, genetic counseling, role-responsibility, wanting to know/not 
know
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Diagnostic uncertainties are common for many genetic conditions 
affecting clients and their families—what Barlow-Stewart (2018) 
aptly calls ‘the certainty of uncertainty in genomic medicine’. Fueled 
by new genomic technologies such as exome sequencing, the ethos 
of uncertainty is generated and sustained through inconclusive test 
results as well as secondary findings inclusive of variants of uncer-
tain significance (VUS), with wide-ranging implications for clients 
and their close family members. Paradoxically, new forms of ge-
nomic testing are aimed at reducing diagnostic uncertainties but the 
proliferation of such new testing technologies contributes to gen-
erating further uncertainties. More generally, genetic tests give rise 
to primary and secondary findings1  and it is the secondary findings 
which may be part of a diagnostic process in a clinic setting or in 
pursuance of targeted scientific research.
In the clinic setting, there is a call for shifting the focus from 
reduction of uncertainty to management of uncertainty within a 
positive frame (Barlow-Stewart, 2018; Newson, Leonard, Hall, & 
Gaff, 2016), while attending to emergent ethical dilemmas (Balcom, 
Kotzer, Waltman, Kemppainen, & Thomas, 2016). Framing is a key 
concept here. Like risk, uncertainty can be framed in beneficial 
or harmful ways, thus making clients’ desire to know or not know 
specific genetic test results rather nuanced. Focusing on the nexus 
of uncertainties and attendant ethical tensions, in this paper we 
examine how diagnostic uncertainties occasion clients’ accounts 
of wanting to know or not know, including the risks and benefits 
of knowing, via orientations to self-other role responsibilities. Our 
main focus is the ways in which genetic counselors and clients 
communicatively manage the emergent ethical tensions in the face 
of diagnostic uncertainties. Our research questions are the follow-
ing: (i) How do diagnostic uncertainties give rise to articulations 
of wanting to know/not know; and (ii) how do the ethical tensions 
surrounding wanting to know/not know invoke orientations to dif-
ferent trajectories of role responsibilities by genetic counselors 
and clients?
2  | LITER ATURE RE VIE W
Uncertainty management is not unique to genetic counseling, but in-
tegral to healthcare delivery more generally. More than 50 years ago, 
Fox (1957) identified two basic types of uncertainty in the practice 
of medicine: (a) uncertainty due to incomplete and imperfect mas-
tery of available medical knowledge at the individual level; and (b) 
uncertainty due to the limitations of present medical knowledge. A 
further type of uncertainty stems from ‘the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between personal ignorance or ineptitude and the limitations of 
present medical knowledge’ (Fox, 1957: 208–209). The scenario of 
‘limitations of present medical knowledge’ mostly prevails in genetic 
counseling when rapid advances in genomic knowledge are not only 
beyond the reach of individual practitioners but also that certain 
new knowledge, as in the case of new testing technologies, does 
not necessarily translate into daily practice, thus generating further 
uncertainties.
Atkinson (1984) has drawn attention to the nuances underpin-
ning the concept of uncertainty by stressing that it must be under-
stood as a relational category vis-à-vis certainty in medical (scientific) 
knowledge on the one hand and clinical (experiential) knowledge on 
the other. In a later study, Atkinson (1995: 114) asserts that ‘personal 
knowledge and experience are not normally treated by practitioners 
as reflections of uncertainty, but as warrants for certainty’.
In the context of cancer clinics, McIntosh (1978) points out how, 
in addition to diagnostic and prognostic uncertainties, doctors have 
to cope with two other forms of uncertainty relating to patients: (a) 
uncertainty about patients’ genuine desire to know a bad diagnosis 
and prognosis; and (b) uncertainty about how patients might react to 
bad news, whether diagnostic or prognostic. These two dimensions 
of uncertainty which foreground the client perspective are of partic-
ular relevance for our study in that individual clients in the genetic 
counseling setting may orient to diagnostic uncertainties differently, 
expressed through their desire to know or not know what can be 
known.
Hallowell, Hall, Alberg, and Zimmern (2015) argue that exome 
sequencing, in particular, raises ethical concerns for genetic coun-
selors regarding disclosure of genetic findings. Disclosure of pri-
mary findings in the clinical context may be a straightforward case, 
whereas any disclosure of secondary findings that may arise during 
the sequencing process will be influenced by clinical matters such as 
severity and treatability. The authors suggest that genomic testing 
increases the need to involve family members in order to clarify sec-
ondary findings. According to them, communication of results in a 
research setting may differ along different types of feedback policies 
and associated degrees of client autonomy, while demanding expla-
nations from researchers that facilitate informed choice. Hallowell 
et al. (2015) rightly claim that the distinction between research and 
clinical activities are becoming blurry and suggest that the context 
at hand should serve as a guide for what ethical principles might be 
relevant when discussing with clients the potential risks and benefits 
of knowing a test result.
Uncertainty management has been studied in the genetic coun-
seling context, mainly using interview and questionnaire data (e.g., 
Babrow & Kline 2000; Kenen, Ardern-Jones, Lynch, & Eeles, 2011; 
Skirton & Bylund, 2010; van Zuuren, Van Schieb, & Van Baarenc, 
1997; Van Zwieten, Willems, Knegt, & Leschot, 2006) rather than 
through the close analysis of clinical encounters. For instance, Van 
Zuuren et al. (1997) draw attention to how information is provided 
to clients in the face of uncertainty. By focusing on framing biases in 
risk perception, they pay attention to the information delivery pro-
cess, but not from a discourse-analytic perspective.
The discourse-analytic studies focusing on clinical encounters ad-
dress the notion of uncertainty in relation to risk communication (Aasen 
& Skolbekken, 2014; Brookes-Howell, 2006; Henneman, Marteau, & 
Timmermans, 2008; Sarangi, 2002; Sarangi, Bennert, Howell, & Clarke, 
2003; Thomassen & Sarangi, 2012). In emphasizing the interrelation-
ship between uncertainty and risk, Sarangi (2002: 8) notes that ‘genetic 
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risk explanations of what might and might not happen […] necessarily 
border on the notion of uncertainty and probability, resulting in the 
production of warrants’. This position echoes Mary Douglas’s (1986: 
42) classic statement that ‘a great deal of risk analysis is concerned 
with trying to turn uncertainties into probabilities’. As Rapp (1988: 148) 
points out in the context of prenatal diagnosis, ‘the language of genetic 
counseling is resolutely statistical; it is an axiom of good counseling 
that a patient must be told her risks before she can decide to take or re-
fuse the test’. Here, we have a juxtaposition of two viewpoints: the lan-
guage of probability may pose difficulties of understanding for clients 
(Adelswärd & Sachs, 1996), but clients have the right to know what can 
be known, including uncertain test results.2 
Genomic testing often reveals ambiguous findings (Smith, Michie, 
Allanson, & Elwy, 2000), and genetic counselors are expected to 
manage ‘boundaries of uncertainty’ during the consultation (Stivers 
& Timmermans, 2016). In analyzing video-recorded genetic counsel-
ing sessions of families undergoing exome sequencing, Stivers and 
Timmermans (2016) find that geneticists give parents access to their 
reasoning when dealing with ambiguous results, followed by ques-
tions, and sometimes challenges, from parents. Diagnostic uncer-
tainties stemming from inconclusive evidence may influence clients’ 
decisions in favor of more testing and surveillance (Thomassen & 
Sarangi, 2012) as finding a diagnostic label becomes a prerequisite to 
manage uncertainty societally (Brookes-Howell, 2006). Both Aasen 
and Skolbekken (2014) and Henneman et al. (2008) argue that clini-
cal experience is crucial for counselors whether aiming at reduction 
of uncertainty or acceptance of uncertainty in light of individual cli-
ent needs.
Weighing both the risks/uncertainties and the benefits/gifts 
of knowing constitutes an integral aspect of genetic counseling 
(Sarangi et al., 2003). In the management of uncertainty vis-à-vis risk 
communication, Sarangi et al. (2003) observe that genetic counsel-
ors use specific discourse strategies to relativize risk along the lines 
of ‘risk of occurrence’ and ‘risk of knowing’. The former is related 
to risk assessment and the likely scenarios following a genetic test, 
whereas the latter is concerned with clients’ coping strategies when 
presented with uncertain/ambivalent test results. It seems genetic 
counselors typically explore benefits and risks associated with ge-
netic knowledge whether it is before or after genetic testing. In the 
context of family testing, benefits may be to others than own self 
and may thus be seen as gifts of knowledge arising from new tests 
(Shipman, Sarangi, & Clarke, 2014). This desire to help others can 
extend to family members but also to researchers. For genetic coun-
selors, the positive framing of benefits of knowing may be a way 
of selling the idea about participation in clinical trials or decisions 
regarding genetic tests. As far as clients are concerned, becoming 
aware of benefits could be seen as part of managing risk through 
some level of certainty regarding decision-making. However, the 
scenario of ‘risk of knowing’ is very real and it is something that 
genetic counselors prioritize when diagnostic uncertainties and 
secondary findings cannot lead to any treatment or prevention 
(Townsend et al., 2012). According to Arribas-Ayllon and Sarangi 
(2014:171), genetic professionals shift between non-directive and 
directive stances to ‘explore whether clients can be trusted to make 
autonomous decisions within a climate of uncertainty’. As Clarke and 
Wallgren-Pettersen (2018) suggest, ethical considerations should be 
met with communicative strategies such as ‘what if…?’ hypothetical 
scenarios to challenge and support clients when handling diagnostic 
uncertainty.
Various studies have addressed clients’ orientation to fam-
ily members’ best interests when undertaking genetic testing 
(Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, & Clarke, 2008a, 2008b; Hallowell, 1999). 
Orientation to others is also a key component of genetic counsel-
ors’ communicative practice in balancing non-directiveness and 
client-centeredness (Sarangi, 2010a). As we will see in our analysis, 
such other-orientations take several forms: family others, scien-
tific others, clinical others, and ethical/legal others. In the context 
of genetic counseling, both counselors and clients occupy and shift 
between what Merton (1968) conceptualizes as ‘role-set’, that is, 
‘an array of roles’. In this regard, genetic counselors may orient to 
their role-set as biomedical expert, psychosocial counselor, thera-
pist, service provider, gatekeeper, mediator, etc. This role-set can 
be expanded to include different others such as colleagues, labo-
ratory-based researchers, and the ethics committees regulating the 
provision of genetic/genomic tests and disclosure of test results. On 
their part, clients may orient to their role-set as partner, parent (of 
at-risk versus affected versus normal child), sibling, etc., which may 
also be supplemented by an orientation to scientific others, clinical 
others, and legal others. In our analysis, we will focus on how genetic 
counselors and clients account for their differential role responsi-
bilities vis-à-vis risks and benefits of knowing genetic test results 




Ten pre-test consecutive genetic counseling sessions concerning one 
extended family were audio-recorded within a hospital department 
of medical genetics in Norway.3  The clients were from a family with 
a high burden of colorectal cancer; they had previously been tested 
for known cancer genes, with negative results. Ten different fam-
ily members attended the pre-test clinic sessions. Two counselors 
were involved across the clinics, and both had undergone a 2-year 
university Masters level program for genetic counselors, which in-
corporated essential aspects of genetics as well as communication 
training. Although both counselors were present in a given clinic, 
one of them took on a passive observer role.
3.2 | Recruitment procedure and data collection
Exome sequencing was offered to explore and explain the can-
cer predisposition in this extended family. The study design was 
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approved by the Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics 
and the participants were recruited by means of a personal letter 
explaining the aim and scope of the study. Participation was based 
on written informed consent, emphasizing its voluntary nature, that 
is, their right to leave the study whenever they chose to, without 
having to explain their decision.
The data were collected over a period of fourteen months, 
between 09/13 and 11/14. The audio recordings in Norwegian 
were first transcribed verbatim and then translated in to English 
by the first author and later verified by a competent bilingual 
speaker.4  The names and places have been anonymized to pro-
tect confidentiality. The following simplified transcription con-
ventions were used.
[ ] Overlapping talk
Okay Marked stress
Question mark [?] Raising intonation
OKAY Increased volume
okay:: Lengthening of the 
preceding sound
.hh Inbreath
(2) Timed pause in seconds




We broadly adopt theme-oriented discourse analysis (ToDA, Roberts 
& Sarangi, 2005), which attests the jointly accomplished nature of in-
teraction through participation structure (Goffman, 1981). The joint 
nature of the interaction is explored through: Mapping the struc-
tural, interactional and thematic trajectories; identifying key inter-
actional events within the context of interest; analyzing interaction 
within and across phases in terms of focal themes (e.g., decision-
making) and analytical themes (linguistic/rhetorical devices); and 
connecting the findings to outcomes.
A first step in our analytical procedure is to identify ‘focal 
themes’, similar to the grounded theory approach (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; see also Braun & Clarke, 2006). The next step in-
volves a selection of ‘analytical themes’ or rhetorical devices that 
are utilized in the articulation of the focal themes. In ToDA, it is 
important to map the analytical themes onto the focal themes and 
assess their rhetorical import. Through iterative readings of the 
transcripts and thematic mapping (Sarangi, 2010b) involving the 
first two authors, the following three inter-related focal themes 
emerged: diagnostic uncertainties, risks, and benefits of know-
ing and role relationships. This pre-analytic process constitutes a 
form of coding, not with an aim to quantify the occurrences of the 
focal themes but to reach consistency in terms of theoretical sa-
lience, with the possibility of identifying their nuanced discursive 
manifestations in the data. As will be evident in our analysis, a 
suite of rhetorical devices is deployed by the genetic counselors 
and the clients in their accounts (Sarangi & Clarke, 2002; Scott 
& Lyman, 1968), for example, contrast, extreme case formula-
tion, reported speech, hypothetical construction and pronominal 
reference.
Table 1 below provides illustrative examples of the three focal 
themes and their interrelationship, supplemented by corresponding 
analytical themes.
The examples for in-depth discourse analysis are taken from 
the 10 pre-test sessions, where recruitment of clients to ongo-
ing research studies features in the discussion. As we will see, 
clients’ desire to know includes their right to access available ge-
netic information. The topic of uncertainty comes to the fore as 
the research studies are aimed at reducing prevailing diagnostic 
uncertainties.
4  | DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In our analysis, we focus on how genetic counselors and clients ar-
ticulate diagnostic uncertainties both in terms of benefits and risks 
of knowing and the desire to know or not know—at the professional 
and familial levels—and the extent to which self-other role responsi-
bilities are invoked in respective accounts.
We first present an extended extract on how diagnostic un-
certainties trigger tensions for both clients and counselors (4.1), 
followed by a scenario where diagnostic uncertainties give rise to 
ethical tensions for both parties (4.2). We then introduce selected 
extracts where diagnostic uncertainties lead to clients’ orientation 
to familial others vis-à-vis their justifications for wanting to know 
(4.3), followed by an example which concerns diagnostic uncer-
tainties and genetic counselors’ orientation to scientific and clini-
cal others in justifying clients’ right to be given certain information 
(4.4). The illustrative examples below are representative of the data 
corpus as a whole.
4.1 | Tensions surrounding diagnostic uncertainties
Our first case in Extracts 1a and 1b concerns a female client (CF), 
in her late 50s, who is already affected with breast cancer and has 
had several polyps removed. CF has expressed her intention to 
remain informed about her progressive condition. She is also keen 
for her son (aged 29)—who has a serious illness that is not cancer 
related—to be considered for surveillance for potential colon can-
cer. CF’s brother has had prostate cancer. The genetic counselor 
(GC) describes the nuances surrounding secondary findings as a 
by-product of exome sequencing in the ongoing research study in 
which CF participates. She raises the issue of the client's right to 
have access to the potentially beneficial health information from 
the test result, while alerting her to the risk of knowing ‘that kind 
of information’.
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Extract 1a
01 GC: the disadvantage of such a broad study is that you might find things you were not looking for.hh eh what we call incidental 
findings (.).hh that means that if we then find any common genes (.) go in and look for more (.) find a change that we think might 
lead to disease.hh in a gene that might for example cause a risk of sudden cardiac death (1.5).hh eh there (.) are genes like that 
do exist (.) there are families where that kind of disease accumulates.hh and many of those who come to us they do- are maybe 
a bit prepared when we start looking for that kind of thing because they know it's a relevant issue.hh but as far as I know that is 
not a relevant issue for you.hh and then the question is like what would you think about getting that kind of information?
02 CF: I have a very clear answer to that yes because I guess you understand with both my son and myself then everything that you 
know is fine
03 GC: mm
04 CF: no so that (.) that's absolutely (.) no now I’ve reached this age I mean that.hh every year is in a way a plus.hh so no that (.) I would 
not see that as negative in any way
05 GC: no
06 CF: well one (.) first of all you have the risk for all diseases that all people have
07 GC: yes
08 CF: whether you have inherited it or not (.) and then if you have inherited something then- then (.) you can take precautions (.) yes (.) 
so I have a very clear view on that (.) that's absolutely not a problem for me
09 GC2: mm
10 CF: .hh and one could say that when you are healthy and you don't know how you would react if you were told (.) something like- we 
have thought of that
11 GC2: no
12 CF: yes (.) so
TA B L E  1   Discursive manifestations of the three focal themes and their inter-relatedness: Diagnostic uncertainty; risks and benefits of 
knowing; and role-responsibilities
Focal theme Data examples Analytical themes
Tensions surrounding diagnostic 
uncertainty
‘those who may be a bit prepared […] and a person who has not 
experienced illness’ (GC)
Contrast and pronominal 
reference
‘the worst thing there is for us […] no one wants negative 
messages’(CF)
Extreme case formulation and 
pronominal reference
‘It is because the ethics committee says that as long as there is no 
treatment […]’ (GC)
Reported speech
‘if we were to have incidental findings in which there is serious risk 
to life […] we are not going to give you feedback if we find anything 
that has no treatment’ (GC)
Hypothetical construction and 
pronominal reference
Orientation to risks and benefits 
of knowing vis-á-vis diagnostic 
uncertainty
‘If anything could be picked up at an early stage […] maybe I don't die 
of cancer’ (CM)
Hypothetical construction
‘I can live my life now before I get it’ (CM) Contrast
‘The way I am as a person […] my brother sweeps everything under 
the rug’ (CF)
Contrast
‘if I say that I do want to have it can't I get it then?’ (CM) Hypothetical construction
‘we will have so much information and the question is what benefit 
does one have of all this […] what is important’ (GC)‘I have tried to 
say to the person in the lab […] that we
Hypothetical construction and 
pronominal reference
need to turn this into practice (.) what does it mean for people?’ (GC) Reported speech
Orientation to role-responsibilities 
vis-á-vis diagnostic uncertainty
‘If you decide you do not want to know and your sister decides that 
she does want to’ (GC)
Hypothetical construction and 
contrast
‘OK now I must basically speak for myself but now after all I know my 
sister so well that (1.0) for us I don't think there's a problem’ (CM)
contrast
‘after you said that now we are actually looking at my family (.) that 
strengthens even more and want to be involved’ (CM)
reported speech, contrast, and 
extreme case formulation
‘Me and my wife discussed it when I received the letter […] but I am 
positive’ (CM)
Reported speech
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At the outset in Extract 1a , ‘incidental findings’—glossed as 
‘things you were not looking for’—are implicitly contrasted with ‘ex-
pected findings’ through a test procedure (turn 01). The assumption 
is that while ‘incidental findings’ can generate uncertainty, ‘expected 
findings’ would serve as a step toward diagnostic certainty. GC then 
offers an expanded explanation of what actions might follow the sec-
ondary findings. The potential problem of knowing is underlined and 
a contrast is made between test results being uncertain and how un-
certain test results may be received by different clients (cf. McIntosh, 
1978). The current circumstances of CF are contrasted with those 
who ‘may be a bit prepared’, thus implying that she might get infor-
mation she is not prepared for. This contrast serves as a background 
for GC’s question (turn 01) where she seeks CF’s opinion of whether 
she wants access to the information surrounding secondary findings. 
The question serves a rhetorical function where the topic of want-
ing to know ‘that kind of information’ is linked to a risk of knowing 
scenario.
CF responds by saying that she would exercise her right to access 
all test-related information including diagnostic uncertainties (‘what is 
there to be known’). She upgrades her preparedness for uncertainty cu-
mulatively: ‘everything that you know is [absolutely] fine’; ‘I’ve reached 
this age where every year is a plus’; and ‘nothing can be seen as negative’; 
‘that's absolutely not a problem with me’. This justification implies that 
CF can cope with all information, even if nothing is conclusive. In the 
latter part of turn 08, she signals the ‘benefits of knowing’ (‘you can take 
precautions’) and reasserts her stance to access all available information 
through an extreme case formulation (‘that's absolutely not a problem 
with me’). In essence, she expresses her resilience and readiness to deal 
with uncertainty. CF also alludes to consensual familial communication 
(‘we have thought of that’), signaling that she is not simply exercising her 
individual desire to know but also speaks for the family.
The interaction continues as follows in Extract 1b, with GC ques-
tioning CF’s desire for accessing information in the context of diag-
nostic uncertainties arising from genomic testing.
Extract 1b
13 GC: then there are also other illnesses that relate to you a bit then and that is that one can also find for example something that 
might explain hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.hh and (.) (1.5) in relation to this kind of illness then you can say that heart 
disease (.).hh where it can sometimes be prevented because one should then avoid medicines that might trigger eh heart 
rhythm disorders.hh eh and (2.0) some people also have a both a pacemaker implanted and possibly an ICD a kind of heart 
starter.hh one also gets some diet- life- eh (.) recommendations about lifestyle (.) some of these sudden-death cardiac genetic 
defects.hh can after all also be triggered by sudden sounds (.) like alarms and.hh one might be recommended to maybe have an 
alarm clock with birds chirping instead. hh eh then it might be best to avoid competitive sports and things like that.hh when it 
comes to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer then we are thinking more about what type of preventive measures that maybe 
might involve [removing] an organ preventively
14 CF: [mm]
15 GC: .hh is that the kind of thing you would like to know [if it?]
16 CF: [yes I] (.) we would really like to know what it's possible to know to put it that way (.) for us uncertainty is in a way the worst 
thing there is for us
17 GC: mm
18 CF: eh (.) obviously there's no one who wants (1.0) [any] negative messages like that
19 GC: [no]
20 CF: but if things are the way they are then I want (.) at least I want to know that
In turn 13, GC latches on to the ‘benefits of knowing’ as she lists 
hypothetical scenarios where preventive measures can be taken (e.g., 
avoidance of certain medication; implantation of pacemaker and ICD; 
modification to alarm sounds; refraining from competitive sports). 
Following this long explanation/information sequence, in turn 15, GC 
returns to the question (as posed in turn 01) of whether CF wants to 
receive health information, but this time she draws attention to a pos-
sible tension between CF’s desire for knowledge and the future sce-
narios to cope with such knowledge. By pursuing the ‘risks of knowing’, 
GC underlines the need to clarify secondary findings in the context 
of family testing (Hallowell et al., 2015). As earlier, CF reasserts her 
wanting to know what can be known. Note that she uses the inclusive 
‘we’ to characterize the family as uncertainty averse and formulates 
an extreme case scenario (‘the worst thing for us’, turn 16). In turn 18, 
CF offers another characterization via extreme case formulation—‘no 
one wants negative messages’. Turn 20 echoes CF’s wanting to know 
stance as in turn 16, while acknowledging the delicacy of the question 
at hand.
Let us consider the last part of this extended extract (Extract 
1c) where GC returns to CF’s stance and seeks additional risk 
information.
Extract 1c
21 GC: yes (.) [do you think] it would be the same for a person 
who has not experienced illness the way you have 
who is completely healthy or? (5.0)
22 CF: [yes] yes (.) hard to say
23 GC: .hh do you think it's because of your experience that 
you have that attitude?
(Continues)
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Extract 1c
24 CF: .hh yes maybe maybe a bit- a bit like that hh.hh yes 
when all this started to strike you could say I was 
a bit lucky in a way because that was sort of my 
perspective on this with life and so on then
25 GC: yes
26 CF: that I have (.) yes
27 GC: yes
28 CF: a bit the way I am as a person
29 GC: mm
30 CF: eh for my- after all it's quite clear that we tackle 
these things in very different ways
31 GC: mm
32 CF: me and my brother are very different
33 GC: mm  
34 CF: my brother is not interested
35 GC: no I see
36 CF: no
37 GC: yes
38 CF: he is ((X)) (.) he sweeps everything under the rug
In turn 21, GC continues with her query to ascertain what makes 
CF so resilient with regard to accessing (potentially) uncertain health 
information and if this is due to her experience of living with cancer, 
which is implicitly contrasted with the healthy population's lack of 
illness experience. The underlying question is: Would healthy indi-
viduals and affected individuals respond to diagnostic uncertainties 
differently? CF’s response in turn 22 (‘hard to say’) is somewhat 
hesitant, but when pursued further by GC in turn 23, CF character-
izes herself as ‘a bit lucky’. She underscores how wanting to know 
or not know may be premised on different motives and then makes 
a contrast between her positive attitude to life (turn 24) and the 
healthy population's potentially ambivalent attitude to life. In turn 
30, CF again returns to generalization with the use of ‘we’, this time 
as a marker of differentiation between herself and her brother—‘we 
tackle these things in different ways’. The fact that the brother is not 
interested in knowing his genetic risk could be construed as implicit 
blame. This works to frame CF as the kind of person who wants 
to take responsibility for knowing additional risk information. For 
exemplification, CF uses contrast to juxtapose her way of managing 
uncertainty (‘the way I am as a person’, turn 28) to that of her broth-
er's (‘who sweeps everything under the rug’, turn 38), thus alluding 
to possible familial tensions surrounding genomic testing. Some of 
the tensions encompassing diagnostic uncertainties can be ethical in 
nature, to which we turn next.
4.2 | Ethical tensions surrounding diagnostic 
uncertainties
In Extract 2a, the male client (CM), in his mid-forties, has been part of 
a surveillance system where he is going through colonoscopy every 
second year. He has had several polyps removed in the process. The 
extract opens with GC explaining that the exome sequencing test 
can generate secondary and uncertain findings, raising ethical is-
sues about what information clients can be given access to. Prior to 
the opening of the extract, GC and CM have already touched upon 
the topic of recruitment for the ongoing research study.
Extract 2a
01 GC: yes (.) and here we come to something that is important (.) and this is about whether (.) but now you have said quite a bit about it 
yourself (.).hh in relation to (1.0) would you like (.) feedback if we find the cause of the high occurrence in your family (.).hh and (.) 
if we were to have secondary findings (1.0) in which there is serious risk to life and health and that there are preventive measures 
available.hh that means (.) we are not going to give you feedback if we find anything that is serious that has no treatment (1.5) it 
is (.) and there is a kind of ethical perspective in all of this (.) because (.) if you suspect that there is some hereditary condition in 
your family (.) then we should rather look at that in a separate counselling session (.) first of all then (1.0) take it away from the 
research project itself.hh but (.) I don't know if you have heard about a disease called Huntington?
02 CM: I don't think
03 GC: no ok
04 CM: no
05 GC: there is no cure.hh and (.) it is like a serious condition which we are not going to give you an answer about if we were to find that 
genetic defect in you
06 CM: why not?
07 GC: yes because [I say]
08 CM: [so if] I say that I do want to have it
09 GC: yes
10 CM: can't [I get it then?]
11 GC: [no] it is because the ethics committee says that as long as there is no treatment we are not allowed to (.) […] because we 
discussed […] whether we should have a clause that one would like feedback about serious illness for which there was no 
treatment for (.).hh and it- and here one has like come to the conclusion that it would be unethical
(Continues)
Extract 1c Continued
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Extract 2a
12 CM: they're wrong about that
13 GC: yes
14 CM: absolutely wrong
15 GC: and that's something you must [feel free to say] and then you can feel free to say it loud and clear ((laughs))
In turn 01, GC provides institutional guidelines surrounding 
what information can be made known, and through a contrast she 
demonstrates what may count as ‘benefit of knowing’ versus. ‘risk 
of knowing’ (Sarangi et al., 2003) with regard to secondary find-
ings. GC justifies a collectively shared ‘ethical perspective’ (‘if we 
find anything’), although it is somewhat unclear what the referent 
of ‘we’ is here. Does it collectively represent the counselors’ and 
the researchers’ points of view or only of the former? GC’s account 
comes across as a tendency to safeguard the institutional guidelines 
and their gatekeeping function with regard to available information 
(‘we are not going to give you an answer’). GC enhances her ethi-
cal stance through contrast: knowing in order to take ‘preventable 
measures available’ and avoid ‘serious risk to life’ versus. knowing 
‘anything that is serious that has no treatment’. The issue of clients’ 
wanting to know becomes a part of her role responsibility, where 
GC orients to both scientific others (‘we find the cause’) and familial 
others (‘your family’) before shifting to clinical others vis-à-vis the 
ethical tensions outside of the research project (‘disease without 
treatment’).
The ethical tensions regarding how the intervention regime 
would unfold and who would have the right to what can be known 
if there are any secondary findings are placed in the family context. 
Due to the hybrid nature of the counseling session, GC is ethically 
torn between being client-centered in order to reduce diagnostic 
uncertainty (i.e., arranging ‘separate counseling session’) while, si-
multaneously, attempting to recruit clients for research to accom-
plish scientific (epistemic) certainty (i.e., encouraging ‘participation 
in research project’). This tension between the clinical setting and 
the research setting confirms the relevance of how differential eth-
ical principles should be operative in these two contexts (Hallowell 
et al., 2015).
In turn 05, GC reaffirms her ethical position concerning 
non-disclosure of diagnostic findings for which ‘there is no cure’. 
‘Risk of knowing’ serves as a justification for non-disclosure of ‘ir-
relevant’ test results. The tension between CM’s desire to know 
and GC’s ethical concerns is articulated through a hypothetically 
framed question pointing to the contrasting stance: ‘if I say that 
I do want to have it can't I get it then?’ (turns 8, 10). GC justifies 
her stance on non-accessibility through the use of reported speech 
(‘the ethics committee's perspective’), which indexes an ethical 
dilemma in that certain test results can be irrelevant and cause 
anxiety, which may border on ‘risk of knowing’. However, CM man-
ifestly disagrees with the ethics committee's non-disclosure policy 
through extreme case formulation (‘they are [absolutely] wrong’, 
turns 14, 16) and affirms his preference regarding disclosure of any 
test result. In turn 15, GC aligns with CM and his right to access 
genetic knowledge while she also feels compelled to uphold the 
ethics committee's injunctions about non-disclosure, which counts 
as an ethical dilemma.
The interaction continues as follows in Extract 2b.
Extract 2b
19 GC: [eh and so] because it is interesting for us to 
actually do what you think about it
20 CM: yes I have a very clear opinion about that yes 
(.) eh if I for some unknown reason get or 
eh (.) what should I say then (.) genetically 
predisposed or am going to get a serious 
illness (.) then for me it is completely irrelevant 
whether this is because of a bad cancer gene 
or something else (1.0) I want to know it 
anyway
21 GC: mm
22 CM: if I get to know something that is part of this 
study or your research (0.5) ehm well that is 
fine too (.) but if it it is not what you are doing 
research on I still want to know it
23 GC: [mm]
24 CM: so for me what caused is not important (.) for me 
it is (.) if I get to know that I may have or have 
huge possibilities to get Alzheimer
25 GC: mm
26 CM: then I will of course want to know it
27 GC: mm
28 CM: why shouldn't I want to know? (.) then I can well 
of course (.) well then I can live my life now 
[before I get it]
29 GC: [laughs]
30 CM: well it is after all my assessment then what I will 
do with it (.) and [why]
In turn 19, GC alludes to other clinicians’ and the ethics commit-
tee's collective stance on this delicate matter. Through a reasoned 
demand (‘I want to know it anyway’), CM justifies his stance again 
through contrast: ‘A genetically predisposed […] illness’ is implic-
itly contrasted with an accidental ‘bad cancer gene’. CM’s account 
signals that disclosure about inheritance is in the welfare of him as 
a client and this serves as a justification for demanding access to 
health information (turn 22). CM upgrades his desire for diagnostic 
certainty while underlining his ability to cope with epistemic un-
certainty linked with hereditary conditions that have no treatment 
(turns 24, 26). As in extract 2a, in turn 28, CM disagrees with the 
Extract 2a Continued
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official protocol about non-disclosure and voices his strong critique, 
with a rhetorical question—‘why shouldn't I want to know?’—fol-
lowed by a temporal contrast: ‘I can live my life now [before I get 
it]’. CM justifies his right to access information which he can act on 
and thus demonstrates that he has the capability to assess and cope 
with uncertain knowledge. As a final gesture, in turn 30, CM asserts 
his autonomous stance toward both knowing and what to do with 
his knowing.
In what follows, we consider how clients and counselors orient 
to their role responsibilities as a way of foregrounding the ethical 
tensions surrounding diagnostic uncertainties, while justifying their 
respective role responsibilities regarding what can be known.
4.3 | Clients’ orientation to familial others vis-à-vis 
diagnostic uncertainties
Extract 3 is from the same encounter as extracts 2a & 2b, and here 
we focus on the client's (CM’s) orientation to self-other relations 
when exercising his desire to know in the event of diagnostic un-
certainties. It is worth reiterating that the client and his extended 
family had previously been tested for known cancer genes, with 
negative results. Exome sequencing was offered to further explore 
and explain the cancer predisposition in this family. Previously, GC 
and CM have talked about the rationale behind exome sequencing, 
as illustrated in prior extracts, and about researching for certainty 
to reduce uncertainty in this specific family. GC initiates the topic of 
disclosure of test results, and she articulates diagnostic uncertainty 
as part of the family history (‘a family where we don't know the de-
tails’). In framing such disclosure as a sensitive issue, GC simultane-
ously dwells on the specific value of targeting the research study on 
one particular family.
Extract 3
01 GC: but then I could (.) if it would be OK with you to ask 
you about one thing
02 CM: mm
03 GC: because eh you say that it is a strength you think and 
we think so too that you are related (.) and there is 
after all a family where we don't know the details 
so that it is also something.hh one of those that in a 
way has been on my mind in terms of is it possible to 
find out something more here
04 CM: mm
05 GC: .hh but then the thing is this that when we discussed 
this here with the ethics committee they thought that 
it might become a burden for you (0.5).hh because 
how would it be if you for example decide that you do 
not want to know anything (1.0).hh and then maybe 
(0.5) your sister decides that she does want to (.) and 
then how will you be able to handle it (1.0)
06 CM: .hh [eh]
07 GC: [do you see] that it might be a=
Extract 3
08 CM: no OK now I must basically speak for myself but now 
after all I know my sister so well that (1.0) for us I 
don't think there's a problem- problem situation (.) 
myself I am strong enough (.) but I mean (.) eh that 
I will handle it anyway (.) whatever the outcome 
whatever I am told know whatever (.) all information 
is better than no information (.) the way I see it (.) I 
am curious enough by nature too I (.) that you are 
welcome to explain a bit to me (.) don't need to go 
far far down into the depths (.) but I understand 
enough that I can pick up some valuable info then 
(0.5).hh and (0.5) I am absolutely sure at the end of 
your questions here that I want to know everything
09 GC: mm  
10 CM: absolutely sure
11 GC: yes
12 CM: I’ve come to terms with those thoughts before I came 
here or when I got this here and thought through 
it then (.) this has two sides for me (1.0) after you 
said that now we are actually looking at my family (.) 
that strengthens even more and want to be involved 
(1.5) precisely because it is cool to be able to 
contribute to research that others may benefit from 
(.) that's maybe the cherry on the top here then
13 GC: mm
14 CM: but of course I am egoistic enough as well (.) that 
I would like to get hold of all information that 
concerns myself (1.5) if anything could be picked 
up at an earlier stage that could maybe (.) get 
something started that would mean I maybe I don't 
die of cancer (.) early (1.0) maybe later or I mean
15 GC: mm
16 CM: everything that could improve my life situation
The extract opens with GC’s account of ‘risk of knowing’ (‘might 
become a burden to you’), followed by a contrast: ‘you do not want 
to know’ versus. ‘she [sister] wants to know’. Wanting to know avail-
able test results is foregrounded as a sensitive—and even divisive—
issue in the family sphere. GC formulates a potential ethical dilemma 
regarding familial differences by sketching a hypothetical future 
scenario. In other words, GC raises the ethical concerns about CM’s 
coping strategies when dealing with certainty/uncertainty (turns 
05–07) through use of reported speech (‘ethics committee thought 
it might be a burden to know’, turn 05). Our analytical interest here 
is how CM responds to such an ethical framing. As before (see ex-
tract 1c in particular), the rhetorical device of contrast becomes a 
resource to orient to familial others’ attitude to uncertainty in test 
results. In turn 08, CM disregards the ethical concerns and justi-
fies his stance toward wanting to know (‘I am strong enough’; ‘I am 
curious enough by nature too’). The sister is implicated as he ex-
ercises his right to access health information (‘I know my sister so 
well that for us I don't think there's a problem’). Unlike in extract 
1c, the brother and the sister are presented as a unity, rather than 
being differentiated. CM upgrades his certainty about wanting to (Continues)
Extract 3 Continued
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know as opposed to the diagnostic uncertainty announced by GC 
through extreme case formulations (‘I will handle it anyway’; ‘I want 
to know everything […] ‘absolutely sure’), thus characterizing him-
self as someone who can cope with the ‘risk of knowing’.
As can be seen in turn 12, CM orients to both his own and his fam-
ily's future wellbeing in an altruistic manner (‘looking at my family […] 
strengthens even more […] it is cool to contribute to research that other 
may benefit from’). The rationale underpinning his decision to want to 
know does not fully acknowledge the embedded dilemma as indicated 
by GC (turn 12). In turn 14, CM simultaneously characterizes himself 
(‘I am egoistic’) and points to a hypothetical future event which is pre-
ventable through knowing (‘maybe I don't die of cancer early’). This 
constitutes an essential part of CM’s justification for wanting to know 
because of the benefits of knowing as well as the timing of knowing 
(‘if anything could be picked up at an earlier stage that could maybe 
get something started’), while orienting to both self and familial others.
4.4 | Counselors’ orientation to scientific and 
clinical others vis-à-vis diagnostic uncertainties
Our final case in Extract 4 concerns a male client (CM) in his early 30s, 
who is the youngest in this extended family. He has just started with 
colonoscopy and has had some polyps removed. His father is seriously 
ill with colon cancer. Previously, the genetic counselor (GC) has men-
tioned the amount of uncertain information the exome sequencing test 
may generate. However, in this case, as opposed to extract 3 where 
we drew attention to the client's self-other-orientations, we look into 
GC’s other-orientations to manage the tensions surrounding diagnostic 
uncertainties. In the encounter, GC repeatedly mentions CM’s right to 
access genetic information in light of this family dealing with diagnostic 
uncertainty and their right to get answers and explanations. It is worth 
noting that CM is a participant in the research study, and that GC has 
an obligation to disclose to him any findings resulting from the research 
study. The question of access to information is foregrounded in the 
interaction.
Extract 4
01 GC: mm (.) yes.hh and well in this study her then 
then it will be- which means you will
have right of access  
02 CM: mm
03 GC: .hh which means you will be able to get 
feedback if we have found anything of
04 CM: Mm
05 GC: of significance healthwise
07 CM: [mm]
08 GC: .hh but you have also right of access which 
actually means that you can ask for access 
about what we have found
09 CM: [mm]
Extract 4
10 GC: [.hh] but at the same time we rather see you 
don't do that because [then] we will have so 
much information
11 CM: [mm] mm
12 GC: and the question is (.) what benefit does 
one have of all this before one kind of [has 
managed to] pick out what is
13 CM: [yeah yeah yeah] No I don't need- [I will not 
ask about it]
14 GC: [important knowledge but] you have right of 
access as it is called
15 CM: yes
16 GC: at the same time as we say we wish you will not 
(.) eh eh take (.) what is it called (.) take it into use
17 CM: mm
18 GC: eh (1.0) do you think (.) what do you think? Is 
this [something you find a little bit strange]
19 CM: [I am not going to take it into no] (.) I am not 
going to require access or like into the matter 
(.) I will just as I say if there is anything [then] 
it is just that one get answers or
20 GC: [yes] mm
21 CM: it is [no more than that]
22 GC: [we we- I don't sit] here saying that you 
shouldn't ask for it [like well]
23 CM: [no no no]
24 GC: but because you do have right of access (.) 
well you [have]
25 CM: [yes]
26 GC: that is like indisputable
27 CM: yes
28 GC: it is just that well then
29 CM: I don't understand any of it anyway I think
30 GC: well (.) I don't know if I would either if [I 
should] ask for access
31 CM: no
32 GC: because I think it's going to be a lot
33 CM: complicated arrangement [I think]
34 GC: [a lot of] material that will take a long time to 
process
35 CM: mm
36 GC: after all there are some who sit and work 
only to try and interpret the findings
GC begins by issuing a statement of what is there to be known 
in the context of exome sequencing based on an implicit contrast 
between what is ‘of significance healthwise’ and the findings that 
are not considered significant (turn 01, 03, 05). GC has a twofold 
other-orientation: first she affiliates with the scientific others who 
are alluded to through ‘this study’; and then with both clinical others 
and scientific others (‘feedback[…] of significance healthwise’). The 
label ‘of significance healthwise’ indexes the client's right to be given (Continues)
Extract 4 Continued
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certain information about secondary findings that would possibly 
affect his health and thus serves as a justification for CM’s future 
right to access information that falls within this label. She orients to 
scientific others (‘we have found’) in the generation of new genetic 
knowledge (turn 08). Rather paradoxically, CM is armed with the 
right of access to all available information but is simultaneously dis-
armed when urged not to exercise this right. That is, CM is framed as 
being autonomous, with the disclaimer that he must act responsibly.
In turn 10, GC orients to clinical others when implying an inclusive 
preferred action (‘we rather see you don't’) in light of lots of uncer-
tain—even irrelevant—information. In turn 18, she inquires about CM’s 
stance on this matter. As can be seen, in turn 19, CM claims, contras-
tively, that he is not after information per se but in search of answers. 
CM further elaborates his position (‘as I said’) and offers a justification 
via orientation to general others through the pronominal choice ‘one’ 
(‘that one get answers’). Through this orientation his role responsibility 
aligns with clinical others and other-others, all of whom are implicated 
in the management of uncertainty. In adding ‘it is no more than that’, 
he acknowledges the complexity of the issue (turn 21).
In turn 22, GC once again reaffirms CM’s moral and legal ‘indis-
putable right’ but uses self-reported speech to foreground the role 
relationships between them as clinicians and the client (‘we don't sit 
here saying you should not ask for it’). CM responds by acknowledg-
ing the clinicians’ dilemma through his limited understandings as a 
client (turn 29). GC then responds with a hypothetical construction: 
whether CM as a research subject would act on his right to access 
information (‘if I should ask for access’). This hypothetical scenario 
is, however, embedded in the specific context of exome sequencing 
producing a set of genetic findings (‘it is going to be a lot’) that needs 
to be sorted out (‘will take a long time to process’). CM aligns with 
GC’s stance on exome sequencing as producing a lot of information 
framed as ‘complicated arrangement’, which alludes to benefits of 
not knowing. By upholding this complex future event, GC justifies 
against disclosure or ‘risks of knowing’, as she explicitly comments 
on the hybrid nature of the encounter as a research study and a 
clinical encounter (see also extract 2b). This is in line with Hallowell 
et al.’s (2015) injunction about the need for different ethical guide-
lines regulating study findings vis-à-vis disclosure of such findings in 
research versus clinic settings.
5  | DISCUSSION
New diagnostic technologies for genomic testing such as exome se-
quencing no doubt offer promises but they generate certain kinds of 
significant uncertainties that pose ethical dilemmas both for genetic 
counselors in the clinic setting (Balcom et al., 2016) and for clients 
in the clinic as well as family settings. A key aspect is that epistemic 
certainty that may be achieved through new technologies, such as 
secondary findings, does not necessarily come with treatment op-
tions and can thus be deemed practically irrelevant for counseling 
purposes. However, the fact that secondary findings can surface 
through test procedures raises the perennial question about who 
has the right to such information and whether ethics committees are 
justified in denying clients access to such information on the ground 
of unavailability of treatment options (extract 2a). The tension is fur-
ther heightened when the client's role-set includes participation in 
an ongoing research study. Our analysis points to the claim that new 
diagnostic knowledge gives rise to uncertainties and triggers ori-
entation to self-other responsibilities—for both clients and genetic 
counselors—which constitute complex role-sets intersecting the do-
mains of familial, scientific and clinical practices. We have also seen, 
as in the case of extract 3, epistemic certainty (what can be known 
scientifically) cannot guarantee diagnostic or prognostic certainty at 
the individual level.
With regard to genetic/genomic science, genetic counselors’ 
participation in ongoing research is instrumental to the development 
and assessment of new genetic/genomic test technologies. In such 
scenarios, genetic counselors may be torn between competing inter-
ests—to help advance scientific knowledge by following strict pro-
tocol on issues regarding clients’ right to access genetic information 
including secondary findings on the one hand, and to foreground 
the benefits of genetic/genomic tests extending to all at-risk family 
members, on the other. The inherent ambivalence of recruiting a cli-
ent or his/her family to exome sequencing puts genetic counselors 
in a difficult position in terms of balancing their provider–client role 
relationship and their role as collaborators with laboratory-based 
genomics researchers and their professional relationship with fellow 
genetic counselors.
With regard to clients, some may foreground their perceptions 
of ‘benefits of knowing’ pertaining to new knowledge which has 
the promise of reducing uncertainty and/or in their pursuit of cer-
tainty about their own and family members’ at-risk status. As can 
be seen in extract 4, CM claims he is not after information per se 
but in search of answers (‘that one get answers’). This distinction 
between ‘information’ and ‘answer’ could also be seen as a distinc-
tion between research study (information) and the clinical setting 
(answer), manifesting a nuanced perspective on the principle of cli-
ent autonomy. It appears that those clients who exercise their desire 
to know are after information per se, not answers. Consequently, 
revealing results from exome sequencing showcases differences be-
tween clinical and research settings when it comes to disclosure of 
genetic information, which requires adjustment at the communica-
tive level, echoing Hallowell et al.’s (2015) appeal for context sensi-
tivity. Other empirical studies concerning the right to know in the 
clinic setting (Forrest et al., 2003; Hallowell et al., 2003) and in the 
research setting (Barton, 2007; Shipman et al., 2014) highlight diffi-
culties in communicating genetic information within families (Clarke 
et al., 2005; Featherstone, Atkinson, Bharadwaj, & Clarke, 2006; 
Mendes et al., 2018) and/or issues regarding gendered responsibility 
(d'Agincourt-Canning, 2001). It raises an important issue at a prac-
tical level: should genetic counselors communicate test results (and 
secondary findings) differently to those clients who are recruited as 
study participants and those who are not?
In our analysis, we have primarily focused on clients’ de-
sire/wanting to know or not know, although at times there is an 
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inevitable slippage between ‘desire to know/not know’ and ‘right 
to know/not know’.5  Clients’ right to know/not know what can be 
known remains a contentious issue in genetic counseling research 
and practice. This issue has attracted a lot of attention, usually from 
legal and moral perspectives foregrounding autonomy (Chadwick, 
Lewitt, & Shickle, 2014; Wilson, 2005) and as part of information/
consent that attests/respects both standpoints, that is, the right 
to know and the right not to know. In the context of exome se-
quencing, it is conceivable that the test results would be of greater 
potential significance to the individual client (Clarke & Wallgren-
Petterson, 2018; Husted, 2014; Kaye, Boddington, Wries, Hawkins, 
& Melham, 2010). As our findings attest, individual clients tend to 
express a desire to know by asserting their rights of access to avail-
able information. Whatever option they choose in a given circum-
stance, they account for their decision, especially as justification. 
For counselors, diagnostic uncertainties also pose challenges in 
terms of what can be communicated and what further courses of 
action can be pursued, while still trying to uphold their non-direc-
tive stance.
At the discursive level, the rhetorical devices of contrast and 
extreme case formulation, among others, are deployed by both 
counselors and clients to engage in discussions regarding disclo-
sure of secondary findings as a potentially divisive matter in the 
family context (extract 1a, extract 3). Especially when orienting to 
family others in uncertainty management, the rhetorical device of 
contrast assumes significance. It becomes a central component in 
stating a role responsibility (‘the way I am as a person’) and infuses a 
moral character to CF’s responsibility in contrast to her brother (‘he 
sweeps everything under the rug’). We also notice the rhetoric of 
contrast between (‘looking at my family’) and (‘research that others 
may benefit from’) being constitutive of role responsibility that goes 
beyond familial others and extends to general others and research-
ers as part of an altruistic motivation (Shipman et al., 2014).
Because of prevailing uncertainty, orientation to different oth-
ers is necessary in the context of genetic counseling. As we have 
seen, the client may orient to himself/herself or familial others, 
whereas the genetic counselor may orient to the client as well as 
to different others, for example, familial others, scientific others, 
and clinical others. The scientific others, however, are not just one 
community but a dispersed entity. Likewise, the label ‘others’ may 
refer to first degree family members or may refer to more ‘general 
others’, like ‘people in your situation’. Other-orientations seem pri-
marily aimed at helping clients’ decision-making as well as coping 
processes.
A theme-oriented discourse analysis of the kind undertaken 
here shows how diagnostic uncertainties give rise to tensions, in-
cluding ethical ones, in both professional and familial spheres, and 
how accounts of orientations to others illustrate that both clients 
and counselors strategically switch between different role respon-
sibilities. There are parallels here to accounts of ethical dilemmas 
qua role responsibilities in the context of childhood genetic testing 
where views of the child's best interest get entangled in competing 
perspectives across parental preference and professional judgement 
(Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, & Clarke, 2009; Clarke, Sarangi, & Verrier-
Jones, 2011; Sarangi & Clarke, 2002). The resultant professional 
ambivalence goes beyond clinicians’ awareness of general ethical 
principles and requires expertise at the interactional, contingent 
level. Our findings echo these studies concerning the interface be-
tween uncertainty management and desire/right to know and not 
know but also extend the discussion to include how genetic counsel-
ors and clients can be strategic in their other-orientations vis-à-vis 
the role responsibilities affordable within a given role-set.
6  | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we began with the observation that genetic coun-
selors and clients are increasingly confronted with uncertainties 
as a by-product of new diagnostic technologies and this leads to 
complex communicative environments in both clinical and familial 
spheres. In addressing our research question as to how diagnostic 
uncertainties are managed communicatively, we have focused on 
the accounts of both genetic counselors and clients underpinning 
the access to genetic information. The accounts draw on a range 
of rhetorical devices (e.g., contrast, extreme case formulation, 
pronominal reference, reported speech, hypothetical construc-
tion) as forms of justification but also as a means to address sen-
sitive issues in a delicate manner. We conclude by pointing to how 
new genomic knowledge can give rise to diagnostic uncertainties 
as well as ethical tensions concerning accessing/disclosing what 
can be known and trigger other-orientations vis-à-vis role respon-
sibilities, intersecting the scientific, clinical and familial spheres. 
It is perhaps helpful to consider certainty and uncertainty as rela-
tional categories and as part of a continuum, while acknowledging 
the ever-widening gap between epistemic (un)certainties at the 
population level and diagnostic uncertainties at the individual/
familial level.
6.1 | Study limitations and practice implications
Our study has several limitations, typical of any qualitative study, 
in that the findings are not generalizable across genetic conditions 
and across clinical settings and families. While not generalizable, 
the findings are potentially transferrable to other research settings 
addressing the interface of new technologies of genomic testing 
and the communicative challenges facing genetic counselors in 
the clinic setting. In genetic counseling, dealing with uncertainty 
is not merely a matter of providing warrants for what is certain and 
known, but also a matter of managing diagnostic and epistemic un-
certainties and the attendant ethical tensions through accounts of 
role responsibilities.
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 1 We are grateful to Reviewer 2 for drawing our attention to the dis-
tinction between ‘incidental findings’ and ‘secondary findings’, fol-
lowing the deliberations of the ACMG (American College of Medical 
Genetics) and other organizations. We use the term secondary findings 
in our analytical commentary but retain the term incidental findings in 
the original data extracts. 
 2 In the Discussion section we return to the terminological nuances sur-
rounding ‘wanting/desire to know or not know’ and ‘right to know or 
not know’. 
 3 The larger dataset consists of 18 sessions, including 8 post-test 
sessions. 
 4 The original transcripts can be made available upon request from the 
first author. 
 5 We acknowledge Reviewer 1’s remark that ‘rights involve attendant 
obligations in the ways that desires do not’. 
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